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43 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND  
CAUSAL DETERMINISM: CORRECTED VERSION 
J G MOORE* 
INTRODUCTION 
In analytical jurisprudence, determinism has long been seen as a threat 
to free will, and free will has been considered necessary for criminal 
responsibility.1 Accordingly, Oliver Wendell Holmes held that if an 
offender were hereditarily or environmentally determined to offend, then 
her free will would be reduced, and her responsibility for criminal acts 
would be correspondingly diminished.2 In this respect, Holmes followed 
his father, Dr. Holmes, a physician and man of letters.3 Similar theories, 
such as neuropsychological theories of determinism, continue to influence 
views on criminal responsibility, although such theories do not imply that 
it is physically impossible for accused persons to act other than they do.4 
This suggests that some amount of free will is compatible with theories of 
this kind. Nevertheless, the common understanding that accused persons 
can be free and responsible agents might disappear altogether if people 
were to accept the truth of causal determinism,5 which is the philosophical 
thesis that there is only one physically possible future consistent with the 
 
 
 *  The author is an analytical philosopher who is presently reading for the degree of Juris 
Doctor at the University of New South Wales. The original version of this Article was submitted in 
partial fulfillment of the requirements of that degree. The author would like to acknowledge Dr. Marc 
De Leeuw, who supervised the original version. 
 1. Luis E. Chiesa, Punishing Without Free Will, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1403, 1405 (2011); 
Stephen J. Morse, Criminal Responsibility and the Disappearing Person, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2545, 
2547 (2007) [hereinafter Morse, Criminal Responsibility]; Stephen J. Morse, Determinism and the 
Death of Folk Psychology: Two Challenges to Responsibility from Neuroscience, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & 
TECH. 1, 1 (2008) [hereinafter Morse, Determinism]. See also United States v. Grayson, 438 US 41, 52 
(1978), in which Burger C.J. held that “a deterministic view of human conduct . . . is inconsistent with 
the underlying precepts of our criminal justice system”; R v. Kennedy [2007] UKHL 38 [14], [2008] 
AC 269 [275] (Eng.), in which the House of Lords held that “the criminal law generally assumes the 
existence of free will.” 
 2. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 31 (American Bar Association, 2009) 
(1881). 
 3. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES SR., Crime and Automatism, in OLIVER WENDELL HOMES SR, 
THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 349 (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1891). 
 4. Henrik Walter, Contributions of Neuroscience to the Free Will Debate: From Random 
Movement to Intelligible Action, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL 515 (Robert Kane ed., 2d 
ed. 2011). Contra Morse, Determinism, supra note 1, at 2. 
 5. In this Article, the term ‘accused person’ is used more often than ‘agent’ in order to maintain 
the focus on criminal, rather than moral responsibility. 
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past and the laws of nature.6 Causal determinism touches the criminal law, 
because it implies that it is physically impossible for an offender not to 
offend in the precise way and at the precise time that she does. 
Scholars who conclude that free will is incompatible with causal 
determinism are called “incompatabilists.”7 There are, of course, two sides 
to every scholarly coin. On the other side of this coin are scholars who 
think that free will is compatible with causal determinism. These scholars 
are called “compatibilists.”8 The purpose of this Article is to argue that 
incompatibilism is plausible, and, as a consequence, scholars should adopt 
a view of criminal responsibility and punishment that is consistent with the 
skepticism that this conclusion should generate. This purpose is motivated 
by Hart, who defends compatibilism on the basis that incompatibilism is 
“incautious.”9 
The body of this Article consists in several parts. In Part I, causal 
determinism is explained. In Part II, the notion of free will is discussed. In 
Part III, the neo-Aristotelian compatibilism of Frankfurt, Hart and Morse 
is considered. In Part IV, van Inwagen’s argument for incompatibilism is 
examined. In Part V, an attempt is made to defend incompatibilism against 
Fischer’s neo-Aristotelianism. In Part VI, Hart’s argument for the 
incautiousness of incompatibilism is studied. In Part VII, Fletcher’s causal 
indeterminism is explored. In Part VIII, the concept of legal causation is 
considered. In Part IX, Morse’s normative compatibilism is investigated. 
In Part X, the concept of mens rea is analyzed. Finally, in Part XI, the 
justification of criminal punishment is questioned. 
I. CAUSAL DETERMINISM 
H.L.A. Hart makes only a slight attempt to define “determinism,”10 and 
often shifts his definition between its neuropsychological and causal 
variations. This occurs, for example, when he discusses determinism in 
connection with “physiological or neurological symptoms or 
independently definable psychological disturbances,”11 on the one hand, 
 
 
 6. PETER VAN INWAGEN, AN ESSAY ON FREE WILL 3 (1983). 
 7. Stephen J. Morse, The Non-Problem of Free Will in Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology, 25 
BEHAV. SCI. L. 203, 213 (2007); PETER VAN INWAGEN, METAPHYSICS 271 (4th ed. 2015). 
 8. Chiesa, supra note 1, at 1405; VAN INWAGEN, supra note 7, at 271; George R. Wright, 
Criminal Law and Sentencing: What Goes with Free Will, 5 DREXEL L. REV. 1, 8 (2013). 
 9. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 30 
(2d ed. 2008). 
 10. Id. at 28–31, 48, 53, 179, 241. 
 11. Id. at 32. 
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and “philosophical determinism,” on the other hand.12 To the extent that 
Hart does attempt to define causal determinism, it is as the thesis “that 
human conduct . . . [is] subject to certain types of law, where law is to be 
understood in the sense of a scientific law.”13 Luis E. Chiesa gives a more 
detailed definition along the same lines. For him, causal determinism is the 
thesis that every event, even every mental event, is caused by an 
antecedent event, or antecedent events, together with the laws of nature, 
such that if the event were not to occur, then either the past would have 
been different from what it in fact was, or a law of nature would have been 
violated.14 This is also the view of classical physics, such as the physics of 
Newton and Maxwell, or even the earlier physics of Einstein.15 
John Martin Fischer provides a different definition. According to him, 
causal determinism is the thesis that propositions about the past and the 
laws of nature logically entail propositions about the future, such that if 
the future were to be different, then propositions about the past or the laws 
of nature would be false.16 Scholars who adopt definitions like Fischer’s 
do so, because they believe that logical entailment is well understood, 
whereas causation is “obscure.”17 Moreover, some advocates of a causal 
definition, including Stephen Morse, conflate causal determinism with 
universal causation, which is the view that every event has a cause.18 
While the latter may be true, it does not logically entail causal 
determinism. For example, agents may be able to cause their own 
decisions and actions without being causally determined to do so, or 
causes may not necessarily determine their effects.19 
It is unclear whether Fischer’s definition has any advantage over 
Chiesa’s, other than to prevent confusion on the part of some scholars. To 
begin, propositions about laws of nature seem to include a priori the 
concept of causation, since such laws must at least implicitly be treated as 
the causes of events.20 Moreover, neither definition is compatible with 
accused persons being able to cause their own decisions and actions 
 
 
 12. Id. at 82. 
 13. Id. at 29. 
 14. Chiesa, supra note 1, at 1435. 
 15. David Hodgson, Quantum Physics, Consciousness, and Free Will, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL 57, 57 (Robert Kane ed., 2d ed. 2011). 
 16. JOHN MARTIN FISCHER, THE METAPHYSICS OF FREE WILL: AN ESSAY ON CONTROL 9 
(1994). 
 17. JOHN EARMAN, A PRIMER ON DETERMINISM 5 (Robert S. Butts ed., 1986). 
 18. Morse, supra note 7, at 212; Morse, Criminal Responsibility, supra note 1, at 2547; Morse, 
Determinism, supra note 1, at 14. 
 19. Van Inwagen, supra note 6, at 4. 
 20. TIM MAUDLIN, THE METAPHYSICS WITHIN PHYSICS 151–52 (2007). 
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without being causally determined to do so, or causes not determining 
their effects of necessity, since on either definition it would be physically 
impossible for an accused person to do otherwise unless the past were 
different, or a law of nature were violated. Indeed, the existence of agent 
causation or unnecessitated causation, although consistent with universal 
causation, would be evidence of causal indeterminism. This is because 
agent causation is the thesis that agents are the undetermined causes of 
their own actions,21 while unnecessitated laws of nature would be evidence 
that something like the thesis of probabilistic causation is true,22 which is 
only consistent with determinism if deterministic laws underlie 
probabilistic ones.23 
The upshot is that both definitions imply that there is only one 
physically possible future consistent with the past and the laws of nature, 
and so both exclude the possibility of agent causation and genuinely 
probabilistic causation. For this reason, both definitions are acceptable. If 
causal determinism is true, then there is only ever one physically possible 
future open to one, and so, for any given offender, it is physically 
impossible for her not to offend, in the precise way, and at the precise 
time, that she does.24 That is to say, causal determinism will yield exactly 
one physically possible future provided that the past and the laws of nature 
are fixed. Of course, it is not being claimed that the past and the laws of 
nature are physically necessary, but rather that if they are fixed, then 
necessarily only one future will obtain, if causal determinism obtains. 
Consider the following thought experiment. Suppose that Wadsworth 
kills Smith. If causal determinism is true, and if the laws of nature and the 
past are fixed, then it is physically impossible for Wadsworth not to kill 
Smith in the precise way and at the precise time that he does. In this 
example, does Wadsworth exercise free will when he kills Smith? The 
answer depends, at least partly, on what is meant by the words “free will.” 
II. FREE WILL 
Caution must be exercised in defining free will. It would be naïve to 
suggest that free will requires that human actions and choices be entirely 
undetermined. After all, it is difficult to imagine a human action or 
 
 
 21. Randolph Clarke, Agent Causation and Event Causation in the Production of Free Action, 
24(2) PHIL. TOPICS 19, 19 (1996). 
 22. Kenton Machina, Challenges for Compatibilism, 31AM. PHIL. Q. 213, 220–21 (1994). 
 23. Id. at 221. 
 24. VAN INWAGEN, supra note 6, at 3. 
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decision that is not at least partially determined by biological, linguistic, 
cultural, social, legal, or other factors. On the other hand, if scholars 
accept too weak an account of free will, then their notion of freedom will 
be contrary to any reasonable and common sense meaning of the words. 
According to some scholars, agents have free will if and only if they 
have control over their decisions and actions.25 According to others, agents 
have free will if and only if they have a choice with regard to their 
decisions and actions,26 while others say that agents have free will if and 
only if they could have done otherwise.27 For other scholars, agents have 
free will if and only if they have the actual ability to do otherwise.28 Still 
others take the neo-Aristotelian view that agents have free will if and only 
if their decisions and actions are related to their desires, beliefs and 
intentions, for example, in the appropriate way,29 or that they are 
appropriately responsive to reasons.30 I suggest that having the right sort of 
control over decisions and actions may be sufficient for free will, but that 
the relevant sort of control is not possible if the universe is causally 
deterministic. The first variety of compatibilism to be discussed is the neo-
Aristotelian compatibilism of Frankfurt, Hart and Morse.  
 
 
 25. Randolph Clarke, Indeterminism and Control, 32 AM. PHIL. Q. 125, 126 (1995); Fischer, 
supra note 16, at 158–59; John Martin Fischer, Responsibility and Control, 79 J. PHIL. 24, 38 (1982); 
Patrick Francken, Incompatibilism, Nondeterministic Causation, and the Real Problem of Free Will, 
18 J. PHIL. RES. 37, 38 (1993). 
 26. Alan Brunton, A Definitive Non-Solution of the Free Will Problem, 16 PHIL. INVESTIGATIONS 
231, 231–32 (1993); Francken, supra note 25, at 48; Van Inwagen, supra note 6, at 105. 
 27. Brunton, supra note 26, at 231; Randolph Clarke, Freedom and Determinism, 36 PHIL. 
BOOKS 9, 9 (1995); D. Goldstick, But Could I Have Wanted to Do That? 70 PACIFIC PHIL. Q. 99, 99 
(1989); Van Inwagen, supra note 6, at 106. 
 28. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 27 (1979); 1 GEORGE 
P. FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, AND INTERNATIONAL: 
FOUNDATIONS 273–81 (2007); Peter van Inwagen, How to Think about the Problem of Free Will, 12 J. 
ETHICS 327, 329 (2008); Van Inwagen now avoids the phrase “could have done otherwise” to make 
clear that an actual ability is necessary and that a mere possibility is insufficient for free will. He has 
also abandoned reference to ‘choice,’ because of possible problems with this concept. VAN INWAGEN, 
supra note 7, at 268. 
 29. HARRY G. FRANKFURT, THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT 11–12 (2009); Hart, 
supra note 9, at 48; Morse, Criminal Responsibility, supra note 1, at 2551; Morse, Determinism, supra 
note 1, at 5–6. 
 30. Hart, supra note 9, at 48; Fischer, supra note 16, at 163, 164–68, 172–75; John Martin 
Fischer, Frankfurt-Type Examples and Semicompatibilism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL 
243, 264 (2d ed., 2011); Morse, Criminal Responsibility, supra note 1, at 2551; Morse, Determinism, 
supra note 1, at 5–6. 
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III. THE NEO-ARISTOTELIAN COMPATIBILISM OF FRANKFURT, HART AND 
MORSE 
A. The View Explained 
An important form of compatibilism is neo-Aristotelian 
compatibilism.31 This form of compatibilism originates in the writings of 
Frankfurt, and jurists, such as Hart and Morse, defend versions of it.32 
Neo-Aristotelian compatibilists argue that free will exists even if causal 
determinism is true, and thus only one future is ever open to agents, 
because alternate possibilities are not necessary for free will. What is 
necessary and sufficient for free will, according to these compatibilists, is 
that an accused person’s desires, beliefs or intentions, for example, are 
related to her decisions and actions in the appropriate way, and that they 
are amenable to rational consideration and revision.33 
Frankfurt argues that free will consists in the relation between an 
accused person’s desires and volitions,34 and in her ability “to secure the 
conformity” of her desires to her volitions,35 where volitions are higher-
order desires that certain lower-order desires be the desires that move an 
agent to action.36 With respect to the accused person’s desires, she is 
“free” to make that desire her will by forming a corresponding volition.37 
Thus, whatever the will of the accused person, it could have been 
otherwise.38 Frankfurt argues that free will so described is possible in a 
causally deterministic universe. 
According to Hart, free will, or at least the criminal responsibility for 
which it appears necessary, consists in the satisfaction that agents derive 
from being able to make choices that determine their actions, in 
 
 
 31. Neo-Aristotelian compatibilism is defined here as any version of compatibilism that takes 
free will to consist in doing what one desires, as opposed to being coerced, or in being appropriately 
responsive to reasons, notwithstanding that Aristotle took both of these conditions to be necessary for 
free will. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE: THE 
REVISED OXFORD TRANSLATION 1729, 1752–55 (Jonathan Barnes ed., R. D. Ross trans., J. O. Urmson 
rev., Princeton Univ. Press 1984). 
 32. Frankfurt, supra note 29, at 11–12; HART, supra note 9, at 48; Morse, Criminal 
Responsibility, supra note 1, at 2551; Morse, Determinism, supra note 1, at 5. 
 33. Frankfurt, supra note 29, at 11–12; Hart, supra note 9, at 48; Morse, Criminal Responsibility, 
supra note 1, at 2551; Morse, Determinism, supra note 1, at 5–6. 
 34. Frankfurt, supra note 29, at 11–12. 
 35. Id. at 20. 
 36. Id. at 16. A volition is, for example, one’s higher-order desire that one’s lower-order desire 
not to have a second cup of coffee will prevail over a competing lower-order desire that one may have. 
 37. Id. at 24, 30. 
 38. Id. 
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conjunction with the capacity to be responsive to reasons.39 More 
precisely, free will consists in “the real satisfaction that a system of 
criminal law incorporating excusing conditions provides for [an agent] in 
maximizing the effect of [an agent’s] choices within the framework of 
coercive law.”40 There are three benefits in specifying that such a system 
should include “excusing conditions,” such as mental illness, coercion or 
automatism,41 which eliminate or reduce criminal responsibility.42 First, an 
agent’s ability to predict the likelihood that her choices will lead to 
criminal sanctions is maximized.43 Second, an agent is unlikely to be held 
criminally responsible for a state of affairs that she did not actually 
choose.44 Third, an agent’s ability to weigh the possible satisfactions to be 
gained from choosing to break the law, on the one hand, against choosing 
to comply with the law, on the other, is maximized.45 That is to say, an 
agent is provided with “reasons for exercising choice in the direction of 
obedience,” while still being left to choose.46 A system of criminal law 
that prioritizes choice is apt to maximize satisfaction that an agent has 
with her choices,47 as well as to provide good reasons to act, or to refrain 
from acting, in certain ways, and this, it is implied, is sufficient for free 
will.48 In this way, Hart attempts to show how a certain type of legal 
system is compatible with a neo-Aristotelian account of free will and even 
a necessary condition for his account of free will to work.49 Thus, although 
free will is a necessary condition for both criminal and moral 
responsibility,50 the same account cannot be used to defend moral 
responsibility.51 
Morse’s account is similarly neo-Aristotelian. Although at one point he 
states that free will is unnecessary for criminal responsibility,52 it is plain 
that he is talking about “contra-causal freedom,” which is the freedom that 
requires the ability to do otherwise,53 and that his account of criminal 
 
 
 39. Hart, supra note 9, at 44–45, 48. 
 40. Id. at 48. 
 41. Id. at 14. 
 42. Id. at 31. 
 43. Id. at 47. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. HART, supra note 9, at 44. 
 47. Id. at 46–47. 
 48. Id. at 48. 
 49. Id. at 45. 
 50. Id. at 40. 
 51. Id. at 53. 
 52. Morse, Determinism, supra note 1, at 2. 
 53. See id. at 14. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
50 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 9:43 
 
 
 
 
responsibility involves a neo-Aristotelian account of free will. For Morse, 
free will consists in having certain “desires, beliefs and intentions,”54 and 
in the “capacity to grasp and be guided by good reason” in particular legal 
contexts.55 According to Morse, “free will” is one of the “evergreens” of 
human existence.56 Thus, Chiesa describes Morse as a “classic 
compatibilist,” who argues that “the sort of free will that is needed to 
make sense of the criminal law is not at odds with [causal] determinism.”57 
B. The View Rejected 
According to Fischer, the neo-Aristotelian approaches described above 
are undermined by their structural and ahistorical natures.58 They are 
structural inasmuch as they posit a particular structure of desires, beliefs or 
intentions, for example, as being sufficient for free will. They are 
ahistorical inasmuch as they pay insufficient attention to the etiology of an 
agent’s reasons, decisions and actions. With this in mind, consider the 
following thought experiment. 
Suppose that Nigel is undecided between two conflicting first-order 
desires. Robbing banks, say, against studying law. Suppose further that a 
hypnotist, unbeknownst to Nigel, induces in him a volition to rob banks—
or whatever neo-Aristotelians may require—through subliminal 
suggestions. From this time on, ex hypothesi, Nigel is able to secure the 
conformity of his desires to his volitions, be satisfied with the maximizing 
effects of the criminal law on his choices, or be guided by good reasons in 
legal contexts. However, since Nigel has no control over his volition, it 
must be concluded that he is not free when he finds himself preferring to 
rob banks. Thus, the accounts given by neo-Aristotelians are compatible 
with situations in which the accused person clearly lacks free will. 
It is hard to see the relevant difference between Nigel’s situation and 
the situation that he would be in if causal determinism is true. Nigel would 
be no freer if his volition were causally determined because he would have 
no more say in the matter under the influence of causal determinism than 
he would under the influence of the hypnotist. After all, if causal 
determinism is true, then an agent’s neo-Aristotelian mental structures and 
abilities are causally determined along with everything else. 
 
 
 54. Id. at 3. 
 55. Stephen J. Morse, Reason, Results, and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 
440 (2004); Morse, Determinism, supra note 1, at 7, 20. 
 56. Morse, Criminal Responsibility, supra note 55, at 2575. 
 57. Chiesa, supra note 1, at 1407. 
 58. FISCHER, supra note 16, at 208. 
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Neo-Aristotelian compatibilists can reply in at least two ways. First, 
they can argue that there is a relevant difference between the causally 
deterministic case and the case in which Nigel finds himself. This 
difference consists in the fact that thought experiments of the above kind 
often hypothesize the existence of a malevolent hypnotist, or a tumor, for 
example, that is controlling the accused person. It is these “bogeymen,” as 
Dennett calls them, that are doing all the work.59 Dennett argues that an 
agent lacks control only in cases in which she is being controlled.60 If the 
bogeymen are removed, then the incompatibilist is left with the 
uninteresting claim that the accused person’s decisions and actions are 
causally determined along with everything else. However, it is not the 
compatibilist’s task to show how the accused person can escape causal 
determinism. To argue that the accused person’s decisions and actions are 
not free, because they are causally determined, is to beg the question 
against the compatibilist. 
Second, neo-Aristotelian compatibilists can argue that the etiology of 
the accused person’s mental states is irrelevant to the question of free will, 
so long as she has the capacity to make those states her own through a 
process of rational reflection.61 It may be supposed that this is what an 
agent achieves through securing the conformity of her desires to her 
volitions, et cetera. Thus, it does not matter who or what put the mental 
states there in the first place. 
In response to the first reply, the incompatibilist can deny the claim 
that an accused person lacks control only in cases in which she is being 
controlled by someone or something else. As Fischer points out, there are 
at least two ways in which it can be true that an agent lacks free will. An 
agent lacks free will when that agent is controlled by someone or 
something or when that agent lacks a locus of control.62 Dennett, however, 
appears to be assuming that the only way in which an agent can lack free 
will is by being controlled by someone or something else. 
In response to the second reply, it can be said that neo-Aristotelians 
leave the reader to solve the mystery of how an accused person secures the 
conformity of her desires to her volitions, et cetera. These would be 
mysterious abilities in a causally deterministic universe, especially if, as 
 
 
 59. DANIEL C. DENNETT, ELBOW ROOM: THE VARIETIES OF FREE WILL WORTH WANTING 7–10 
(1984). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Richard Double, Puppeteers, Hypnotists and Neurosurgeons, 56 PHIL. STUD. 163, 167 
(1988). See also Daniel C. Dennett, Brainstorms 252–53 (1981). 
 62. FISCHER, supra note 16, at 18. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 9:43 
 
 
 
 
Frankfurt suggests, they allow an accused person to constitute her will 
otherwise.63 Indeed, this would smack of the agent causation posited by 
some indeterminists, and invites the suspicion that neo-Aristotelians are 
not really compatibilists.64 On the other hand, if these abilities are causally 
determined, then it would be physically impossible for them, as well as 
their antecedents and consequences, to be otherwise. These abilities would 
be a part of a process that has only one physically possible path, and over 
which no one has, or ever had, or ever will have, any control.65 In 
connection with Hart, it is hard to see how adding an extra layer of 
determinism, in the form of a system that determines satisfaction with 
choices, and which, ex hypothesi, must itself be causally determined, could 
make free will, as opposed to a mere subjective experience of free will, 
more likely in a causally deterministic universe. Neo-Aristotelians thus 
attempt to explain a mystery with a mystery. 
IV. VAN INWAGEN 
A. The Consequence Argument 
An argument for the incompatibility of free will and causal 
determinism that has received much attention is Peter van Inwagen’s 
Consequence Argument.66 The argument, in its general form, is that if 
causal determinism is true, then decisions and actions of agents are the 
consequence of events that happened before they were born, together with 
the laws of nature. However, it is not up to them what happened before 
they were born, or what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the decisions 
and actions of agents are not up to them.67 
An early version of this argument employs the concept of “choice 
necessity,”68 which van Inwagen describes as the necessity opposed to free 
will. The argument relies on two rules of inference. Rule (α) roughly states 
that if a proposition is true of physical or causal necessity, then no one has, 
or ever had, any choice about whether it is true. Rule (β) may be expressed 
in the following way. Suppose that p is the case, and that no one has, or 
 
 
 63. FRANKFURT, supra note 29, at 24. 
 64. This is because they would be assuming an ability to do otherwise, and that agents have the 
power to secure the conformity of their volitions to their desires. 
 65. See the discussion of Fischer’s view of Neo-Aristotelian compatibilism infra Part V. 
 66. Van Inwagen, supra note 6, at 16. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Peter van Inwagen, Logic and the Free Will Problem, 16(3) SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 277, 284 
(1990). 
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ever had, any choice about whether p is the case. Suppose further that if p, 
then q is a true conditional, and that no one has, or ever had, any choice 
about whether this is so. It follows that q, and that no one has, or ever had, 
any choice about whether q is the case. Readers may think of Rule (β) as 
an argument within an argument. Thus, choice necessity is said to transfer 
from the premises to the conclusion of that argument.69 
In elucidating the relevance of this argument to the present problem, it 
will be apposite to return to the thought experiment involving Wadsworth. 
Remember that Wadsworth is a killer. Remember also that if causal 
determinism is true, and if the laws of nature and the past are fixed, then 
Wadsworth’s killing Smith is the only physically possible outcome. There 
are compatibilists who admit that causal determinism rules out alternate 
possibilities, but argue that alternate possibilities are not necessary for free 
will. The version of the argument being considered is designed to show 
that choice, which is, according to van Inwagen, the condition necessary 
for free will, is incompatible with causal determinism. 
In setting out this argument, let p be a sentence expressing the 
conjunction of all the true propositions concerning the past and the laws of 
nature at a certain instant before the existence of humankind, and let q be a 
sentence expressing the conjunction of all the true propositions concerning 
the state of the universe at the instant Wadsworth kills Smith. Assuming 
that causal determinism is true, it is physically necessary that if p, then q is 
a true conditional. It follows from Rule (α) that no one has a choice in 
whether if p, then q is true. In addition, no one has a choice in whether p is 
true. Therefore, from Rule (β), no one has a choice in whether q is true. 
That is to say, Wadsworth kills Smith, and no one has, or ever had, a 
choice about whether this is so. Not even Wadsworth. Surely, therefore, 
Wadsworth is not free. Because the argument concerns any agent, any 
time, and any true proposition about what is the case at a given time, it is 
natural to conclude that if causal determinism is true, and if the laws of 
nature and the past are fixed, then no one ever had, or has, or will have, a 
choice about anything. If there is no way that an agent can have a choice in 
her actions, then there is no sense in attributing free will to that agent. 
Scholars might, of course, take a weaker view of free will to mean that an 
agent is free insofar as her decisions and actions conform with her desires. 
However, as evident from the prior discussion of neo-Aristotelian 
compatibilism, mere conformity of decisions and actions with desires is 
not sufficient for free will. Be that as it may, it will be apposite to take a 
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Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 9:43 
 
 
 
 
closer look at this version of the Consequence Argument and its two rules 
of inference. Rule (α) is uncontroversial.70 However, the validity of Rule 
(β) is the subject of some controversy.71 
B. Against the Consequence Argument 
The most influential argument for the invalidity of Rule (β) comes 
from Thomas McKay and David Johnson.72 The argument involves a 
direct counterexample to Rule (β), which may be explained as follows.73 
First, let p express the proposition that “the coin does not land heads,” and 
let q express the proposition that “the coin is not tossed.” Assume that 
someone could choose to toss the coin, but no one does, and that the coin 
is fair. Because the coin is fair, no one has a choice that p. It is also true 
that no one has a choice that if p, then q is true, because its consequent is 
true, and because no one has a choice about whether the conditional is 
false, because that would require being able to choose that the coin lands 
tails. However, it is false that no one has a choice that q, because, ex 
hypothesi, someone could choose to toss the coin. Thus, Rule (β) and the 
argument that depends upon it appear to be invalid. 
If this is true, then an agent may have a choice in her actions, in the 
sense relevant to free will, even though she has no choice regarding the 
past or the laws of nature, and even though she has no choice that the past 
and the laws of nature entail that it is physically impossible for her to do 
otherwise. That this result is counterintuitive does not mean that it is false. 
As argued below, however, the incompatibilist has nothing to fear from 
arguments of the kind put forward by McKay and Johnson. This is despite 
the fact that van Inwagen admits that McKay and Johnson’s 
counterexample establishes the invalidity of the Consequence Argument.74 
 
 
 70. This seems to be universally accepted by compatibilists. See, e.g., KADRI VIHVELIN, CAUSES, 
LAWS, AND FREE WILL: WHY DETERMINISM DOESN’T MATTER 158 (2013). 
 71. See, e.g., Mark Ravizza, Semi-Compatibilism and the Transfer of Non-Responsibility, 75 
PHIL. STUD. 61 (1994); Michael Slote, Selective Necessity and the Free-Will Problem, 79 J. PHIL. 5 
(1982); Vihvelin, supra note 70, at 157–62. 
 72. Thomas J. McKay & David Johnson, A Reconsideration of an Argument against 
Compatibilism, 24(2) PHIL. TOPICS 113, 116–17 (1996). 
 73. The argument also involves a formal logical argument showing that Rule (β) entails the 
principle of agglomeration, and a counterexample to show that agglomeration is invalid for choice 
necessity, but a consideration of the direct counterexample will be sufficient for a legal audience. In 
any event, the direct counterexample is at least as persuasive as the indirect one. Those with an 
understanding of formal logic may wish to consult the original article. 
 74. Peter van Inwagen, Free Will Remains a Mystery: The Eighth “Philosophical Perspectives” 
Lecture, 14 PHIL. PERSP. 1, 3 (2000). At least this admission was made by van Inwagen in connection 
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C. For the Consequence Argument 
There are at least two desiderata for any argument for compatibilism. 
First, the truth of compatibilism should not be presupposed.75 Second, the 
truth of causal indeterminism should not be presupposed.76 The first 
desideratum was suggested by van Inwagen,77 and endorsed by McKay 
and Johnson,78 while the second desideratum was suggested by McKay 
and Johnson themselves.79 It is thus surprising that McKay and Johnson’s 
counterexample assumes that a coin could be tossed, even though it is not. 
Either McKay and Johnson’s non-toss of the coin occurs in a causally 
deterministic universe or in a causally indeterministic universe. If the 
former is the case, then in assuming that it is possible that the coin is 
tossed, the first desideratum is violated. If the latter is the case, then the 
second desideratum is violated. For these reasons, van Inwagen may have 
capitulated too easily. 
McKay and Johnson propose several ways of repairing Rule (β).80 One 
of their suggestions is to express the rule in the following way. Suppose 
that p and no one has, or ever had, any ability whatsoever to render p 
false.81 Suppose further that if p, then q is a true conditional, and no one 
has, or ever had, any ability whatsoever to render this conditional false. It 
follows that q, and that no one has, or ever had, any ability whatsoever to 
render q false. 
McKay and Johnson contend that if Rule (β) is modified in this way, 
then their counterexample involving the coin cannot succeed.82 This is 
because if no one has any ability whatsoever to affect the truth of the 
sentence ‘the coin does not land heads’, then it follows that no one has any 
ability whatsoever to affect the truth of the sentence ‘the coin is not 
tossed’.83 According to McKay and Johnson, modifying Rule (β) in this 
 
 
with McKay and Johnson’s indirect counterexample, but, as indicated in supra note 73, the direct 
counterexample is at least as persuasive as the former. 
 75. Thomas M. Crisp & Ted A. Warfield, The Irrelevance of Indeterministic Counterexamples to 
Principle Beta, 61 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 173, 175 (2000). 
 76. Id. at 180. 
 77. Van Inwagen, supra note 6, at 102–03. 
 78. McKay & Johnson, supra note 72, at 113. 
 79. Id. at 118. 
 80. Id. at 118–21. 
 81. Id. at 119. 
 82. Id. at 119–20. 
 83. Id. at 119. 
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way makes it valid.84 Of course, Rule (α) would have to be expressed in 
compatible terms in order that the Consequence Argument is made valid. 
In more recent writings, van Inwagen appears to have more or less 
followed McKay and Johnson’s suggestion,85 although he now calls Rule 
(β) the “Principle,” and has abandoned Rule (α) altogether.86 The Principle 
relies upon the new notion of “untouchable facts.” According to van 
Inwagen, to say that p expresses an untouchable fact is to say that no one 
is, or ever has been, able to do anything about p, and that no one ever 
would have been able to do anything about p, no matter what knowledge 
she might have had, and no matter how lucky she might have been.87 
It is now possible to explain the Principle in the following way. 
Suppose that p expresses an untouchable fact, and that if p, then q 
expresses an untouchable fact. It follows that q expresses an untouchable 
fact.88 To accept this principle is to accept that whenever p and if p, then q 
express untouchable facts, q will express an untouchable fact, regardless 
of what propositions are substituted for p and q.89 Suppose that p expresses 
an untouchable fact about the past before human beings existed and the 
laws of nature. Suppose further that if p, then q is an untouchable fact, 
because it is a consequence of the truth of causal determinism, and q 
expresses the proposition that Wadsworth kills Smith. It follows from the 
Principle that q is an untouchable fact. No one is, or ever has been, able to 
do anything about whether Wadsworth kills Smith, and that no one ever 
would have been able to do anything about this, no matter what knowledge 
he or she might have had, and no matter how lucky he or she might have 
been.90 
For van Inwagen, the problem of free will and causal determinism is 
the problem of how accused persons are able to decide and act in the 
actual universe, rather than some possible universe with a different past or 
laws of nature, since, according to him, the ability to add to the actual past 
in accordance with the actual laws of nature is necessary for free will.91 
Thus, for van Inwagen, if an accused person has no actual ability to decide 
 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. VAN INWAGEN, supra note 74, at 8; Peter van Inwagen, Freedom to Break the Laws, 28 
MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 334, 350 (2004); Van Inwagen, supra note 28, at 329; VAN INWAGEN, supra 
note 7, at 274–76. 
 86. Van Inwagen, supra note 7, at 274–76, 281, 284–85, 339. 
 87. Id. at 274. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 275. 
 90. See id. at 274. 
 91. See id. at 267; Van Inwagen, supra note 74, at 9–10. Contra David Lewis, Are We Free to 
Break the Laws?, 47(3) THEORIA 113, 116 (1981); VIHVELIN, supra note 70, at 162–66. 
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or act other than she does, then there is no way that anyone could sensibly 
attribute free will to that accused person. Fischer, however, adapts neo-
Aristotelian arguments to show that the ability to decide or act otherwise is 
not necessary for free will.92 
V. FISCHER’S NEO-ARISTOTELIAN COMPATIBILISM 
A. The Supposed Irrelevance of the Ability to Decide or Act Otherwise 
Like other neo-Aristotelians, Fischer accepts that if causal determinism 
is true, then only one future is ever open to an accused person,93 and 
argues that the ability to decide or act otherwise is not necessary for free 
will.94 He thus denies what Frankfurt calls the “principle of alternate 
possibilities,”95 on the basis that Frankfurt-type examples appear to show 
that alternate possibilities, or the ability to do otherwise, are irrelevant to 
questions of free will.96 
In a Frankfurt-type example, an accused person is deciding between 
two or more competing courses of action. Unknown to the accused person 
is the existence of various factors sufficient to ensure that she is unable to 
decide or act other than she does. These factors, moreover, come into play 
and prevent the accused person from deciding or acting only when she 
begins to show a tendency towards deciding to act in another way. 
However, since the accused person shows no such tendency, these factors 
do not come into play to affect her decision or action, or constrain her to 
decide or act in any way. The following is a Frankfurt-type example. 
Suppose that Dr. Nefarious, while performing neurosurgery on the 
unsuspecting Wadsworth, attaches an electronic device to Wadsworth’s 
brain.97 This device emits certain signals indicating Wadsworth’s neural 
activity. Suppose also, that Nefarious programs his computer to receive 
these signals and to intervene via remote control to ensure that Wadsworth 
decides to kill Smith and actually does so. 
In this thought experiment, Wadsworth is unable to do anything other 
than to decide to kill Smith and actually do so. However, say that 
Wadsworth, for reasons of his own, decides to kill Smith and actually does 
 
 
 92. FISCHER, supra note 16, at 262–65. 
 93. Id. at 180, 188; Fischer, supra note 30, at 263. 
 94. FISCHER, supra note 16, at 188; Fischer, supra note 30, at 262–64. 
 95. FRANKFURT, supra note 29, at 1. 
 96. Fischer, supra note 30, at 262–64. 
 97. This example is inspired by Frankfurt’s ‘Black’ example in FRANKFURT, supra note 29, at 6–
7. 
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so, such that it is unnecessary for Nefarious to intervene. In such 
circumstances, surely Wadsworth kills freely. When Wadsworth kills 
Smith he possesses the free will required for criminal responsibility, even 
though he is unable to decide or act otherwise. Surely, this is a 
counterexample to the claim that the ability to do otherwise is necessary 
for free will. 
Strictly speaking, this is not a counterexample to the claim that the 
ability to do otherwise is necessary for free will. This is because, ex 
hypothesi, Nefarious has that ability. However, say that we get rid of 
Nefarious. Suppose, instead, that Wadsworth has a brain tumor that will 
secrete a neurotransmitter that will act upon his brain in such a way that he 
will develop an irresistible desire to kill Smith. Suppose further, that if 
Wadsworth decides to kill Smith for reasons of his own, the 
neurotransmitter will not be activated. Nevertheless, Wadsworth decides 
to kill Smith, and actually does so, independently of the neurotransmitter’s 
influence. In this example, Wadsworth surely kills freely, in the sense that, 
at the time of killing Smith, Wadsworth possesses the free will required 
for criminal responsibility. 
To be sure, Wadsworth is not responsible for the fact that the state of 
affairs, “Wadsworth kills Smith,” obtains. Nevertheless, it seems that 
Wadsworth is responsible for the act of killing Smith to precisely the same 
degree as he would be if Nefarious or the tumor were not present. After 
all, neither Nefarious nor the tumor play any role in leading Wadsworth to 
decide and act as he does. Although Wadsworth has no alternative to 
killing Smith, he does not do so only because he has no alternative.98 He 
would kill Smith even if he could do otherwise. Thus, Wadsworth kills 
Smith freely. 
This may be stretching the notion of free will too far. After all, free will 
is typically thought to require the actual ability to do otherwise. That said, 
surely this is begging the question against compatibilists like Frankfurt 
who accept that causal determinism rules out alternate possibilities. After 
all, whether free will exists in the absence of alternate possibilities is 
precisely the point at issue. However that may be, according to Fischer, 
the relevant ability is the ability of an agent to guide her actions, and this 
does not presuppose the existence of alternate possibilities. In making this 
argument, Fischer distinguishes between “regulative control” and 
“guidance control.”99 
 
 
 98. Frankfurt, supra note 29, at 8. 
 99. Fischer, supra note 30, at 263. 
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Consider the following thought experiment, which will be called 
“Fischer’s motorist.”100 Suppose that Nigel is driving his motorcar. Insofar 
as Nigel has the ability to guide his car in a certain direction, he has 
guidance control over the direction in which the car travels. Insofar as 
Nigel has the ability to guide the car in alternate directions, he has 
regulative control over the car’s movements. Imagine that Nigel comes to 
a fork in the road, decides to take the right hand fork, and proceeds to steer 
the car to the right. However, suppose that, unbeknownst to Nigel, the 
steering mechanism in his car has developed a temporary fault, such that 
should he attempt to steer the car to the left, then the car will travel down 
the right hand fork just as if Nigel had steered it so. However, since Nigel 
does not attempt to steer the car to the left, and since the steering 
mechanism functions properly when he steers the car to the right, it can be 
said that Nigel–despite lacking regulative control–has guidance control 
over the movement of the car. According to Fischer, this sort of Frankfurt-
type example shows how regulative control and guidance control can “pull 
apart.”101 Consequently, such examples show how an accused person can 
have control without having the sort of control that involves alternate 
possibilities.102 
Returning to Wadsworth, it is clear that he lacks regulative control. 
However, if Fischer is to be believed, Wadsworth retains guidance control. 
If guidance control is sufficient for an agent to have free will in the 
absence of alternate possibilities, and if Wadsworth’s having guidance 
control over his decisions and actions explains his criminal responsibility 
for those decisions and actions, Wadsworth possesses the free will 
required for criminal responsibility, even though he is unable to decide or 
act other than he does. 
Fischer agrees with van Inwagen that if causal determinism is true, then 
accused persons lack the ability to decide or act otherwise.103 Where 
Fischer differs from van Inwagen is in his contention that the ability to 
decide or act otherwise is not necessary for free will.104 On Fischer’s 
account, free will requires a certain sort of control over decisions and 
actions. The possession of the sort of control that involves alternate 
possibilities, regulative control, is ruled out if causal determinism is 
 
 
 100. See FISCHER, supra note 16, at 132–33 (providing a similar example). 
 101. Id. at 133. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 180, 188; Fischer, supra note 30, at 263. 
 104. FISCHER, supra note 16, at 188; Fischer, supra note 30, at 262–64. 
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true.105 However, according to Fischer, an accused person can have an 
important kind of control even if she lacks regulative control. That is to 
say, she can have guidance control even in the absence of alternate 
possibilities.106 Thus, although free will is associated with control, it need 
not be the sort of control that involves alternate possibilities. 
According to Fischer, Frankfurt-type examples show that free will 
depends on what happens in the actual sequence of events leading to a 
decision or action.107 In other words, free will depends on the actual 
history of the sequence of an agent’s actions and decisions, and not on the 
existence or nature of alternate possibilities. Accordingly, an agent 
possesses free will if and only if she has guidance control over the actual 
sequence of events leading to her decision or action.108 Guidance control is 
thus both necessary and sufficient for free will. It is Fischer’s argument 
that guidance control is possible in a causally deterministic universe.109 
For Fischer, an agent has guidance control over a determined sequence 
of events if the deliberative mechanism that operates in that sequence is 
appropriately responsive to reasons.110 An agent is appropriately 
responsive to reasons when her deliberative mechanism is functioning 
normally. Conversely, an agent who is, for example, suffering from 
persecutory delusions and command hallucinations, may not be free, 
because she may not be appropriately responsive to reasons. It is natural to 
think, therefore, that the difference between free agents and unfree agents 
consists in their ability to be appropriately responsive to reasons. 
Fischer argues that in Frankfurt-type examples the mechanism that 
actually operates is reasons-responsive, while the mechanism that would 
operate in the alternative sequence is not.111 In Wadsworth’s case, the 
decision to kill Smith results from an appropriately reasons-responsive 
mechanism. However, in the alternative scenario, the mechanism that 
would operate is not reasons-responsive, because Wadsworth is being 
controlled by Nefarious. The idea is that the mechanism in the actual-
sequence, and hence the accused person, can be reasons-responsive even 
where the accused person is unable to decide or act other than he does. 
 
 
 105. FISCHER, supra note 16, at 135, 142, 148, 190–91; Fischer, supra note 30, at 263. 
 106. FISCHER, supra note 16, at 132–35, 147, 160–68, 186, 205, 215; Fischer, supra note 30, at 
263–64. 
 107. FISCHER, supra note 16, at 139, 148–49, 157–58, 163, 184; Fischer, supra note 30, at 262–
64. 
 108. FISCHER, supra note 16, at 133. 
 109. Id. at 168; Fischer, supra note 30, at 263–64. 
 110. FISCHER, supra note 16, at 163, 164–68, 172–75; Fischer, supra note 30, at 264. 
 111. FISCHER, supra note 16, at 163. 
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Fischer distinguishes between weak and strong reasons-
responsiveness.112 A mechanism is strongly reasons-responsive if it 
actually issues in an action or decision, and if there were sufficient reason 
to do otherwise, and the mechanism were to operate, the accused person 
would decide and act otherwise.113 However, according to Fischer, strong 
reasons-responsiveness, while sufficient, is not necessary for guidance 
control.114 To see this, consider the following. 
Suppose that, as a result of the normal functioning of his deliberative 
mechanism, Wadsworth decides to kill Smith. Before doing so, 
Wadsworth recognizes that there is a good reason not to kill Smith. He 
proceeds anyway. According to Fischer, even an accused person who acts 
against good reasons can be reasons-responsive if she is responsive to 
some reasons.115 Such an accused person would be weakly reasons-
responsive.116 If the actual sequence of events leading to an action or 
decision is weakly reasons-responsive, then the accused person in question 
can be said to possess guidance control over that sequence of events. That 
is to say, weak reasons-responsiveness is sufficient for guidance control.117 
Fischer’s argument may be summarized with the following three 
propositions. First, weak reasons-responsiveness is sufficient for guidance 
control. Second, guidance control is both necessary and sufficient for free 
will. Third, guidance control is compatible with causal determinism. 
B. Against Fischer 
Fischer may have shown, pace van Inwagen, that alternate possibilities 
are not necessary for free will, but he has not shown that free will is 
compatible with causal determinism. For, if causal determinism is true, 
then accused persons are not like Fischer’s motorist. That is to say, they 
are not free homunculi operating causally determined machines, but rather 
they are the “machines.” 
In a Frankfurt-type example, the question is whether a hypothetical free 
accused person remains free despite certain changes to that accused 
person’s situation. The actual sequence of events leading to the accused 
person’s action is distinguished from an alternative sequence in which the 
accused person is clearly unfree. In the actual sequence, the accused 
 
 
 112. Id. at 164–68. 
 113. Id. at 164. 
 114. Id. at 167–68. 
 115. Id. at 167. 
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 117. Id. at 168. 
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person is not compelled to act in any way, and the common intuition is 
that the accused person remains free. But such intuitions often do not take 
account of causal determinism and may differ if it were specified that the 
sequence of events in question is causally determined. 
Of course, to say that an accused person lacks free will, because the 
actual sequence of events leading to her decision and action is causally 
determined, is to beg the question against the compatibilist. As Fischer 
points out, the incompatibilist has not given any reason, apart from the fact 
that causal determinism rules out alternate possibilities, for thinking that 
causal determinism is incompatible with free will.118 But neither has 
Fischer shown how an agent can have guidance control over a determined 
sequence of events. 
If causal determinism is true, there is no nefarious neurosurgeon, or 
tumor, or any such person or thing, waiting to disrupt the course of events 
if the accused person shows any sign of deviating down a different path. 
The chain of events leading to an accused person’s decision and action 
proceeds in the only way consistent with the laws of nature, and it is hard 
to see how an accused person could have guidance control over such a 
sequence of events. If causal determinism is true, each link in the chain of 
events leading to an accused person’s decision or action is causally 
sufficient for the event that immediately follows it. By the same token, 
each link in the chain of events leading to an accused person’s decision or 
action is a causally necessary effect of the event that immediately precedes 
it.119 Trace this chain of events in any direction, and at no link will the 
accused person plausibly possesses guidance control. 
That said, as Fischer argues, for an accused person to have guidance 
control over a determined sequence of events is just for that accused 
person’s deliberative mechanism to be appropriately responsive to reasons, 
and that weak reasons-responsiveness is sufficient for guidance control. 
This aspect qualifies Fischer’s account as neo-Aristotelian, and leads to 
the following criticism. 
Suppose that Dr. Nefarious “rewires” the unconsenting Wadsworth’s 
brain in such a way that his desires and volitions are the exact opposite of 
what they were before the operation. In addition, Nefarious replaces 
Wadsworth’s reasons-responsive mechanism with one he removed from 
 
 
 118. Id. at 149. 
 119. Forgetting for a moment the complexity of diverging causal chains. 
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the corpse of a homicidal maniac.120 One result of this intervention is that 
Wadsworth now has a first-order desire to kill Smith, and a second-order 
volition that conforms with this desire. Suppose further that Wadsworth is 
satisfied that he is deciding and acting within a system that prioritizes 
choice and is apt to maximize the effectiveness of his choices, and that his 
reasons-responsive mechanism is such that whenever anyone points out to 
him that killing Smith will likely lead to a term of imprisonment, 
Wadsworth wants to kill Smith all the more. The only thing that would 
constitute a sufficient reason not to kill Smith, as far as Wadsworth is 
concerned, is if he were to discover that Donald Trump approves of 
Smith.121 It appears that since Wadsworth is responsive to at least one 
reason, he satisfies Fischer’s test for weak reasons-responsiveness.122 Yet, 
surely, Wadsworth could not be counted free. Thus, weak reasons-
responsiveness, pace Fischer, is not sufficient for guidance control. 
It may also be argued that strong reasons-responsiveness is not 
sufficient for guidance control. Suppose that Dr. Nefarious replaces 
Wadsworth’s ‘reasons-responsive mechanism’ with one he removed from 
the corpse of a moral and legal saint. One result of this intervention is that 
Wadsworth now has a strongly reasons-responsive mechanism, and is 
forever doing good and lawful deeds.123 Surely Wadsworth is not free in 
his performance of these deeds. Thus, strong reasons-responsiveness is not 
sufficient for guidance control. 
The upshot is that an accused person can have guidance control over 
his decisions and actions even when he is unable to decide or act other 
than he does, but he cannot possess guidance control over a determined 
sequence of events. More precisely, neither strong nor weak reasons-
responsiveness is sufficient for guidance control. Indeed, as the 
counterexamples demonstrate, Fischer’s account of guidance control is 
compatible with situations in which the accused person clearly lacks free 
will.  
 
 
 120. Of course, imagining that there is a discrete object called the ‘reasons-responsive 
mechanism’ is merely an argumentative device. If this part of the story bothers the reader, just imagine 
that Nefarious achieves a similar effect by interfering in various ways with actual neural structures. 
 121. To diffuse any objections involving bogeymen, suppose that Wadsworth enters a matter 
transporter and through an unfortunate and unforeseen malfunction of the machine, his matter is 
scattered and reorganized is such a way that he is qualitatively indistinguishable from the Wadsworth 
in the above example. Interestingly, in an endnote, Fischer admits that a similar example is a problem 
for his account of weak reasons-responsiveness and guidance control. Fischer, supra note 16, at 243 
n.8. 
 122. Id. at 167. 
 123. Of course, the good and the lawful are not always co-extensive. 
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VI. HART ON INCOMPATIBILISM 
One purpose of this Article is to defend incompatibilism against 
compatibilism, the motivation for which is given by Hart, who argues that 
it is ‘incautious’ to be an incompatibilist.124 Rather than use the term 
“incompatibilist,” however, Hart writes about a “determinist who is so 
incautious as to say that it may be false that anyone has ever acted 
‘voluntarily,’ ‘of his own free will,’ or ‘could have done otherwise than he 
did.’”125 The word “determinist” applies only to someone who accepts the 
truth of determinism. Hart’s use of the word, however, seems to refer to a 
“hard determinist,” which is someone who is both a causal determinist and 
an incompatibilist, as opposed to a “soft determinist,” which is someone 
who is both a causal determinist and a compatibilist.126 Hart never 
considers scholars who combine incompatibilism with the thesis that free 
will exists,127 and who therefore accept that causal indeterminism is true.128 
Neither does Hart commit himself to the truth of causal determinism.129 
Thus, his argument may be thought of as an argument against 
incompatibilism simpliciter, which is the thesis that if causal determinism 
is true, then there is no such thing as free will. 
Hart argues from the premise that free will may not be logically 
incompatible with causal determinism to the conclusion that 
incompatibilism is incautious.130 His premise is equivalent to the claim 
that free will may be logically possible and, therefore, not logically 
impossible, in a causally deterministic universe.131 However, 
incompatibilists do not claim that free will is logically impossible if causal 
determinism is true, but only that it is physically impossible. Thus, Hart is 
arguing against a straw man. Further, his argument is a non sequitur. It 
does not follow from the logical possibility that a proposition is true, that 
it would be incautious to hold its negation physically impossible. For 
example, the proposition that it is logically possible for a person to fly to 
the moon by flapping her arms is true, because it is not conceptually 
incoherent. Nevertheless, it is physically impossible that the proposition is 
 
 
 124. Hart, supra note 9, at 30. 
 125. Id. 
 126. VAN INWAGEN, supra note 6, at 13. 
 127. Id. at 13–14. 
 128. Van Inwagen, supra note 28, at 330. 
 129. HART, supra note 9, at 30. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Thus, Hart thinks that incompatibilism is incautious, because compatibilism is not logically 
incoherent. This is not one of his strongest arguments. 
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true, because its truth would entail the contravention of one or more laws 
of nature. Hart’s argument also proves too much. If free will is logically 
compatible with causal determinism, then the absence of free will may be 
logically compatible with causal determinism as well. Either proposition 
seems to be as plausible as the other. If it is possible to conclude that 
incompatibilism is incautious from the former premise, then it is possible 
to conclude that compatibilism is incautious from the latter premise. 
Therefore, Hart’s argument serves only to generate a dialectical stalemate. 
Given this conclusion, together with the conclusions of preceding parts, 
incompatibilism may not seem that incautious. Indeed, most analytical 
philosophers who specialize in the problem of free will and causal 
determinism believe that incompatibilism is true.132 Of course, to argue 
from the premise that a thesis is supported by a majority of specialists, to 
the conclusion that it is true, would be argumentum ad populum. Be that as 
it may, it is not necessary to argue that incompatibilism is true, but only 
that it is not incautious, and that, as a consequence, a view should be 
adopted of criminal responsibility and punishment that is consistent with 
the skepticism that this conclusion should generate. 
If incompatibilism is combined with the traditional view that free will 
is a necessary condition for criminal responsibility, then it follows that 
there is no such thing as criminal responsibility. However, in addition to 
the strategies already considered, there are at least four ways to avoid this 
result. The first is to deny the existence of causal determinism, as some 
incompatibilists do, and try to show that free will is possible in a causally 
indeterministic universe.133 The second is to deny the relevance of causal 
determinism to the criminal law, on the basis that legal theories of 
causation are distinct from philosophical and scientific theories of 
causation.134 The third is to deny the relevance of causal determinism to 
the criminal law, on the basis that the concept of criminal responsibility 
need not conform to any philosophical or scientific facts, because the 
concept is consistent with legal norms and practices that are firmly 
 
 
 132. Van Inwagen, supra note 28, at 338. 
 133. Jos Andenaes, Determinism and Criminal Law, 47 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 
406, 408–10 (1957); Chiesa, supra note 1, at 1407; Eyal Aharoni, Chadd Funk, Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong; & Michael Gazzaniga, Can Neurological Evidence Help Courts Assess Criminal 
Responsibility? Lessons from Law and Neuroscience, 1124 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 145, 147 (2008). 
 134. None of the sources consulted for this Article make this argument, but it may be possible to 
make it given the distinction made between legal theories of causation and philosophical and scientific 
theories of causation in several judicial decisions. See, e.g., March v. Stramare (1991) 171 CLR 506, 
509, 514, 529–31 (Austl.) (Mason, C.J.); Campbell v. The Queen (1980) 2 A Crim R 157 (Austl.) 
(Burt, C.J.); Kolian v. The Queen (1968) 119 CLR 47, 69 (Austl.) (Windeyer, J.); Nat’l Ins. Co. of 
New Zealand Ltd. v. Espagne (1961) 105 CLR 569, 591 (Austl.) (Windeyer, J.). 
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embraced by society.135 The fourth is to deny the relevance of causal 
determinism to the criminal law, on the basis that the concept of mens rea 
is acausal.136 
VII. FLETCHER’S CAUSAL INDETERMINISM 
If causal determinism is incompatible with free will, and if free will is 
necessary for criminal responsibility, the result that criminal responsibility 
does not exist may be avoided by denying the existence of causal 
determinism, as some incompatibilists do, and by showing that free will is 
possible in a causally indeterministic universe.137 A number of 
philosophers and jurists have adopted this approach.138 Such scholars are 
sometimes called “libertarians.”139 Fletcher’s view will be considered here, 
since he is perhaps the most influential jurist to have adopted 
libertarianism.140 
The thesis of causal indeterminism holds that the past and the laws of 
nature “do not determine outcomes unequivocally, but rather leave open a 
spectrum of alternative outcomes, with varying probabilities.”141 That the 
universe is causally indeterministic, at least at the subatomic level, is said 
to be indicated by quantum mechanics.142 Even if this is true, it may not 
follow that accused persons’ conscious decisions and actions are not 
causally determined, because decisions and actions may have nothing to 
do with quantum events. That said, pace some scholars,143 there is 
scientific evidence that suggests that consciousness may depend on 
quantum processes in the microtubules of the neurons of human beings.144 
It is not surprising, therefore, that some scholars argue that if quantum 
 
 
 135. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 55, at 438–39, 443–44. 
 136. This approach is suggested by the fact that causation is said to apply to the actus reus but not 
to the mens rea of a crime. See, e.g., R v. Hallett [1969] SASR 141 (Austl.); Royall v. The Queen 
(1991) 172 CLR 378 (Austl.); PENNY CROFTS, CRIMINAL LAW: ELEMENTS, 38 (LexisNexis, Sydney, 
4th ed., 2011). 
 137. Andenaes, supra note 133, at 408–10; Chiesa, supra note 1, at 1407; Aharoni et al., supra 
note 31, at 147. 
 138. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 28, at 273-81; Hodgson, supra note 15; Robert Kane, 
Rethinking Free Will: New Perspectives on an Ancient Problem, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE 
WILL 381 (Robert Kane ed., 2d ed. 2011); ALFRED R MELE, FREE WILL AND LUCK (2006). 
 139. SIMON BLACKBURN, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 274–75 (2016); Morse, 
Criminal Responsibility, supra note 1, at 2547–52, 2558. 
 140. FLETCHER, supra note 28, at 273–81. 
 141. Hodgson, supra note 15, at 58. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See, e.g., Chiesa, supra note 1, at 1436.  
 144. Stuart Hameroff & Roger Penrose, Consciousness in the Universe: A Review of the “Orch 
OR Theory, 11 PHYSICS LIFE REV. 39 (2014). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol9/iss1/6
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016] CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CAUSAL DETERMINISM 67 
CORRECTED VERSION 
 
 
 
mechanics is true, then accused persons may have the freedom to act other 
than they do.145 
The basis of Fletcher’s libertarianism, however, is not quantum 
mechanics, but the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind. In 
connection with the philosophy of language, he appeals to Chomsky’s 
proof that the number of sentences that human beings are able to 
command in natural language is infinite.146 Although this proof is limited 
to syntactic variations in a language, Fletcher nevertheless holds that it 
applies, mutatis mutandis, to the invention of new words.147 He observes 
that “human beings are constantly inventing new words, and in the case of 
word play in particular, native speakers understand the point of the new 
word immediately.”148 He also observes that causal determinism 
presupposes that a finite set of causes can determine all actions, including 
all acts of speech.149 Arguing by analogy to computers, as 
paradigmatically determined, Fletcher states that it is impossible to 
program a computer to understand words about which the programmer is 
ignorant.150 He concludes that human beings cannot be causally 
determined, because, unlike computers, humankind has the capacity to 
invent and to understand an infinite variety of novel words.151 
In connection with the philosophy of mind, Fletcher appeals to Searle’s 
Chinese Room argument.152 Searle imagines a man locked in a room with 
a manual of instructions in English on how to manipulate strings of 
symbols that the man receives by paper. Unbeknown to the man, the 
strings of symbols are actually questions in Chinese, and in manipulating 
the symbols as per the instructions, and in returning these manipulations 
on paper, the man answers these questions in Chinese. This argument 
purportedly demonstrates that computers may be able to use rules of 
syntax, similar to the man within the Chinese room, without being able to 
understand the semantic content of their answers, any more than the man 
inside the Chinese room can be said to understand Chinese. According to 
Fletcher, the argument raises doubts about the thesis of causal 
 
 
 145. Hodgson, supra note 15, at 58. 
 146. FLETCHER, supra note 28, at 273–81; See also NOAM CHOMSKY, SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES 
23–24 (1957). 
 147. FLETCHER, supra note 28, at 278. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 279. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. See also John R. Searle, Minds, Brains, and Programs 3(3) Behavioral & Brain Sci 417, 
at 417–18. 
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determinism, because it demonstrates that human understanding of a 
language cannot be determined. Computers, qua paradigmatically 
determined devices, can be programmed to manipulate formal symbols, 
but they cannot be programmed to understand a language. Therefore, 
human consciousness must be governed by causal indeterminism.153 
It is not surprising that Fletcher, who is fluent in seven languages,154 
appeals to arguments in the philosophy of language and the philosophy of 
mind, since these branches of philosophy are closely related to the 
discipline of linguistics.155 Fletcher’s account is fascinating, but in its 
present form it should be rejected. 
First, Chomsky’s proof that there is an infinite number of sentences 
that human beings are able to construct in natural language does not entail 
that human consciousness is causally indeterministic. This is because the 
infinite variability of language is thought to result from the brain’s 
capacity for recursion, which is the ability to produce an infinite set of 
utterances from a finite set of rules,156 and because a finite recursive 
program can enable a non-quantum computer to produce such infinite 
combinations of results.157 
Second, it does not follow from Searle’s conclusion that computer 
programs are insufficient for conscious understanding that human beings 
are not causally determined. His point is that the causal powers of the 
human brain are necessary for consciousness, and that such powers cannot 
be given to a computer through programming. While he acknowledges that 
computers with the requisite hardware may one day have such causal 
powers,158 he prefers the view that only a particular kind of organism with 
a particular biological structure is causally capable of understanding and 
other intentional states.159 Fletcher, however, neglects Searle’s comments 
in connection with causal powers and the possibility that such powers can 
only arise through biological processes. Moreover, as Morse observes, 
Fletcher does not consider the power of evolution to select novel 
 
 
 153. FLETCHER, supra note 28, at 279. 
 154. GEORGE P FLETCHER, MY LIFE IN SEVEN LANGUAGES 277 (Mazo Publishers, Jerusalem, 
2011). 
 155. Blackburn, supra note 139, at 211. 
 156. Vivian Cook & Mark Newson, Chomsky’s Universal Grammar: An Introduction 18 (3d ed. 
2007). 
 157. Chiesa, supra note 1, at 1437. 
 158. Searle, supra note 152, at 424. 
 159. Id. at 422. 
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deterministic objects, such as brains, that are capable of understanding and 
other intentional phenomena.160 
Third, even if causal indeterminism is true, the ability to do otherwise 
is not sufficient for free will. For example, an accused person may have 
the ability to do otherwise, but if that ability is the result of a random 
process, then it would be counterintuitive to ascribe free will to that 
person. In this connection, Fletcher gives no reason to suppose that causal 
indeterminism is free of randomness. Indeed, if quantum mechanics is 
true, then it seems that certain indeterministic processes, for example, 
“quantum jumps in atoms,” happen randomly.161 For these reasons, 
Fletcher’s account should be rejected. 
VIII. CAUSATION IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 
The existence of criminal responsibility may be supported by denying 
the relevance of causal determinism to the criminal law, on the basis that 
legal theories of causation are distinct from those of a philosophical or 
scientific nature. This possible counterargument to incompatibilism is 
motivated by Chief Justice Mason in March v. Stramare, who holds that 
the common law rejects scientific and philosophical theories of 
causation.162 Although March v. Stramare is a civil case, similar remarks 
are made in criminal cases.163 
In the law relating to homicide, causation is a requirement of actus 
reus.164 It must be shown that the accused’s voluntary action caused the 
death of the victim to establish the actus reus.165 Voluntary action requires 
a “willed” or “conscious” choice on the part of the accused.166 Since it is 
no part of incompatibilism to deny that human beings make willed or 
conscious choices, this view of voluntary action is uncontroversial. That is 
to say, so long as triers of fact do not conflate voluntariness, qua the 
 
 
 160. Morse, supra note 1, at 2550. 
 161. ROBERT KANE, Libertarianism, in FOUR VIEWS ON FREE WILL 5, 9 (John Martin Fischer, 
Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom & Manuel Vargas eds., 2007). 
 162. March v. Stramare (1991) 171 CLR 506, 529 (Austl.) (Mason, C.J.). 
 163. Campbell v. The Queen (1980) 2 A Crim R 157 (Austl.) (Burt, C.J.); Royall v. The Queen 
(1991) 172 CLR 378, 387–88 (Austl.) (Mason, C.J.); Kolian v. The Queen (1968) 119 CLR 47, 69 
(Austl.) (Windeyer, J.). 
 164. Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) § 18.1(a) (Austl.); Crofts, supra note 136, at 38; The Queen v. 
Katarzynsky (2005) NSWCCA 72 (Austl.); Ryan v. R (1967) 121 CLR 205 (Austl.). 
 165. R v. Katarzynsky (2005) NSWCCA 72 (Austl.); Ryan v. R (1967) 121 CLR 205 (Austl.). 
 166. Bratty v. Attorney-General (Northern Ireland), (1963) AC 386; R v. Falconer (1990) 171 
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absence of automatism, for example, with freedom of the will, and so long 
as they do not take the adjective “reus” in “actus reus” too seriously. 
In criminal law, as in civil law, judges and jurists find it useful to 
divide the concept of causation into “factual causation” and “legal 
causation.”167 In regard to factual causation, juries may look to either the 
necessary cause,168 or the common sense cause of the victim’s death.169 In 
connection with legal causation, the judge may consider whether the 
accused’s conduct was the “operating and substantial cause” of the 
victim’s death,170 or whether there was a novus actus interveniens.171 
Regarding necessary causation, juries may ask whether the conduct of 
the accused was a necessary condition (causa sine qua non) for the 
victim’s death.172 In asking this question, juries apply the “but for” test by 
asking whether the victim’s death would have occurred “but for” the 
accused’s conduct.173 In relation to common sense causation, juries may 
determine the cause of the victim’s death by applying their “common 
sense to the facts as they find them.”174 The common sense test is 
important, according to Chief Justice Mason, where there is more than one 
sufficient cause,175 and, therefore, no single necessary cause, or where 
there is a novus actus interveniens.176 
Regarding necessary causation, Chief Justice Mason observes that 
judges and jurists reject Mill’s philosophical theory that the cause of a 
state of affairs is the set of conditions that is sufficient to produce it, and 
substitute the theory that any necessary member of this set may be a legal 
cause of that state of affairs.177 In connection with common sense 
 
 
 167. March v. Stramare 171 CLR 506, 515 (1991) (Mason, C.J.); Crofts, supra note 136, at 38–
46; MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS AND 
METAPHYSICS 121 (2009). 
 168. Royall v. The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378 (Austl.); R v. White (1910) 2 KB 124 (Austl.). 
 169. R v. Campbell [1997] 2 VR 585 (Austl.); Royall v. R (1991) 172 CLR 378 (Austl.). 
 170. Arulthilakan v. R, [2003] HCA 74 (Austl.); R v. Hallett, [1969] SASR 141 (Austl.); R v. 
Evans (No. 2) [1976] VR 523 (Austl.); R v. Moffatt (2000) 112 A Crim. R 201 (Austl.); Royall v. R 
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 171. R v. Evans (No. 2) [1976] VR 523 (Austl.); R v. Jordan (1956) 40 Cr. App. R. 152 (Austl.); 
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 172. Eric Colvin, Causation in Criminal Law, 1(2) BOND L. REV. 253, 255, 262, 267 (1989); R v. 
Martyr, Qd R 398 (1962) (Austl.) (Mansfield, C.J.). 
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(1991) 172 CLR 378 (Austl.). 
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causation, his Honor seems merely to assume that it is neither 
philosophical nor scientific.178 
In response to Chief Justice Mason’s assertion that the common law 
rejects scientific and philosophical theories of causation, it is worth noting 
that ‘philosophical causation’ and ‘scientific causation’ are considered 
synonymous with ‘factual causation.’179 It may also be worth noting that 
judges and jurists derive the concept of necessary causation from Mill’s 
philosophy.180 In any event, Hart and Honoré’s common sense notion of 
factual causation,181 which is accepted by the Chief Justice,182 is 
inseparable from ordinary language philosophy.183 Moreover, according to 
Moore, the concept of novus actus interveniens, which is one element in 
legal causation, and which the Chief Justice mentions in his judgment,184 is 
not distinct from philosophical causation, if Hart and Honoré’s common 
sense view is accepted.185 This is because Hart and Honoré ground the 
concept of novus actus interveniens in the concept of common sense 
causation.186 In this connection, it is important to note that the Chief 
Justice also grounds the concept of novus actus interveniens in Hart and 
Honoré’s concept of common sense causation.187 
For these reasons, it is difficult to accept Chief Justice Mason’s claim 
that legal theories of causation are distinct from philosophical and 
scientific theories of causation. It may also be difficult to accept that the 
former ought to be distinct from the latter, although it may be thought that 
judges should update the theoretical underpinnings of legal causation, 
given that ordinary language philosophy is long extinct.188 However that 
may be, if this argument against incompatibilism were plausible, then it 
would be difficult to explain why so many jurists argue for the 
compatibility of free will and causal determinism, including those who 
 
 
 178. Id. at 515–16, 518–19, 522–24, 530, 532, 535. 
 179. Butterworths Concise Australian Legal Dictionary 64 (Peter Butt ed., LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 3d ed. 2004). Although this is interesting, no great significance can be attached to a 
name. A case in point is ‘The Holy Roman Empire,’ which, as Voltaire famously said, was neither 
holy, nor Roman, nor an empire. That is, “le saint empire romain n’était en aucun manière ni saint, ni 
romain, ni empire.” See Voltaire, Essay Sur L’histoire Générale, Et Sur Les Moeurs Et L’esprit Des 
Nations, Depuis Charlemagne Jusqu’a Nos Jours (2010) (1756). 
 180. March v. Stramare, (1991) 171 CLR 506, 509, 529–30 (Austl.) (Mason, C.J.). 
 181. H.L.A HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW, ch. 2 (1985). 
 182. March v. Stramare, (1991) 171 CLR 506, 529 (Austl.) (Mason, C.J.). 
 183. MOORE, supra note 167, at 256, 278. 
 184. March v. Stramare (1991) 171 CLR 506, 517 (Austl.) (Mason, C.J.). 
 185. MOORE, supra note 167, at ch. 12. 
 186. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 181, at 5; Id. at 255. 
 187. March v. Stramare (1991) 171 CLR 506, 518 (Austl.) (Mason, C.J.). 
 188. See, e.g., SAUL KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY (1981). 
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write extensively on causation and responsibility.189 If such an argument 
were viable, it would be unnecessary to defend the thesis that criminal 
responsibility is compatible with causal determinism. 
If the common law does not reject philosophical and scientific theories 
of causation, pace Chief Justice Mason, then there may be no principled 
reason why the law could not take into account the theory of causal 
determinism. However, even if legal theories of causation were completely 
independent of philosophy and science, it might be asked whether there is 
such a thing as legal causal determinism, about which scholars would need 
to be compatibilists or incompatibilists. It might be argued that, regardless 
of the legal position, judges and accused persons remain subject to the 
laws of nature, and that no judicial decision can make that otherwise. This 
is similar to the reply that might be given to Lord Justice Styne, who 
claims a distinction between legal logic and formal logic.190 It is one thing 
to claim such a distinction, and quite another to claim that judges are not 
constrained by the limits of logical possibility. Of course, judges may rule 
that round squares are possible, for example, but they cannot actually 
make them so. Similarly, it may be held, as Chief Justice Mason holds, 
that theories of legal causation are independent of the theories of 
philosophers and scientists, nevertheless, the decisions and actions of 
judges, and of the people over whom they sit in judgment, would remain 
subject to causal determinism, if causal determinism is true. 
IX. MORSE’S NORMATIVE COMPATIBILISM 
Jurists may deny the relevance of causal determinism to the criminal 
law, on the basis that the concepts of moral and criminal responsibility 
need not conform to any philosophical or scientific facts, because the 
denial of these concepts would falsify many of society’s norms and 
normative practices. This approach, which is adopted by Morse, takes 
normative facts about free will and responsibility to be compatible with 
causal determinism.191 In this connection, it is apposite to consider the 
reactive attitudes. 
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Reactive attitudes are attitudes that are thought to be essential to moral 
existence.192 Examples of such attitudes are gratitude, forgiveness, 
resentment, love, praise and blame.193 In arguing for compatibilism based 
on reactive attitudes, Morse argues that if incompatibilism is true, and 
there is no such thing as moral or criminal responsibility, then agents 
would have to dispense with such attitudes, and this would undermine 
moral existence.194 Morse also assumes that moral realism is false. That is 
to say, according to Morse, there are no mind-independent facts about the 
universe upon which the truth of moral judgments and practices depend, 
because such judgments and practices are merely human constructs.195 For 
Morse, incompatibilism undermines attitudes that are essential for moral 
existence, and, because moral judgments and practices do not depend upon 
philosophical or scientific facts about causation, incompatibilism should 
be rejected.196 
In response to Morse, it may be replied that the claim that moral 
realism is false, and therefore, that moral antirealism is true, may offend 
against the maxim affirmanti non neganti incumbit probatio,197 especially 
when the only reason that Morse gives for accepting antirealism is that it is 
a ‘common and plausible assumption.’198 Even if antirealism is 
‘unprovable,’ as Morse asserts,199 his colleagues might expect at least 
some argument to underpin the thesis, particularly when realism enjoys the 
support of several important, contemporary philosophers.200 
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In any event, if incompatibilism is true, then the attitudes that must be 
abandoned may not be morally essential. For example, although it makes 
little sense to ascribe blame if incompatibilism is true, it is not clear that 
abandoning such ascriptions would be morally undesirable. Chiesa argues 
that while blame may not be disagreeable in itself, it often gives rise to 
“resentment,” and sometimes leads to a desire for “vengeance” or 
“revenge.”201According to Chiesa, abandoning blame “might lead to a less 
vengeful and violent society,” which would be a “salutary 
development.”202 
Alternatively, if incompatibilism is true, then the attitudes that are 
essential to morality may not need to be abandoned. For example, praise 
may need to be abandoned, but there would be no need to abandon 
admiration or love.203 As Chiesa observes, it is possible to admire or love 
others for qualities for which they are in no way responsible,204 such as the 
color of their eyes.205 Thus, if incompatibilism is true, it does not follow 
that all reactive attitudes must be abandoned. 
Finally, even if Morse is right that incompatibilism entails undesirable 
consequences, it does not follow that incompatibilism is false. Arguing 
that a conclusion must be affirmed, because its denial entails undesirable 
consequences, is the very definition of argumentum ad baculum.206 Thus, 
it does not follow that the existence of criminal responsibility should be 
affirmed, just because its denial may upset established norms and 
practices. 
X. MENS REA 
Some may deny the relevance of causal determinism to the criminal 
law, on the basis that the concept of mens rea is acausal. The fact that 
causation is said to apply to the actus reus, but not to the mens rea of a 
crime, suggests this approach.207 The term “mens rea” is often associated 
with Coke, who wrote, in the margin of one of his reports, “actus non facit 
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reum nisi mens sit rea,”208 but is traced by Justice Stephen as far back as 
Leges Henrici Primi,209 which is from the early twelfth century.210 The 
mens rea is the mental element of an offence.211 In the law relating to 
homicide, the mens rea is thought to consist in an intention, recklessness, 
or negligence.212 Thus, it appears that the mens rea consists in a culpable 
state of mind,213 however “ambiguous and imprecise” concepts like 
intention, recklessness, or negligence may be.214 
If the concept of mens rea is acausal, and being in a certain state of 
mind is necessary and sufficient for criminal responsibility, then the 
concept is neo-Aristotelian and suffers from the same defects as neo-
Aristotelian compatibilism. If, on the other hand, intention, recklessness or 
negligence, for example, is insufficient for mens rea, as the defense of 
mental illness demonstrates, then the concept of mens rea may be 
causal.215 
That mens rea is a causal concept is suggested by the thought that two 
agents could be in exactly similar intentional states, and yet one would 
have the mens rea for murder and the other would not, simply because one 
agent’s intention would be caused by mental illness and the other’s would 
not. M’Naghten may suggest the importance of causation in mens rea, 
because it appears to ask whether the mental state of the accused was 
caused by mental illness such that her understanding of her behavior and 
its consequences were diminished.216 Be that as it may, in R v. Porter, 
Justice Dixon is explicit in holding that something must “cause” a defect 
of reason for the defense of mental illness to be successful.217 
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If mens rea is a causal concept, which it seems to be, and courts may 
look beyond mental states to their causes, then there may be no principled 
reason to disregard causal determinism in connection with mens rea. Of 
course, if courts were to consider causal determinism in this connection, 
and were appropriately skeptical about compatibilism, then perhaps no one 
would be held criminally responsible for any crime. However, so long as 
the adjective “rea” in “mens rea” were not taken literally, courts could 
retain the concept to determine those persons who pose a risk to society. 
XI. CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT 
Glanville Williams argues that even if incompatibilism were true, and 
there were no such thing as criminal responsibility, criminal punishment 
would be justified on the consequentialist basis that it would be causally 
effective as a deterrent to others.218 This view is rightly criticized by van 
Inwagen, because a prisoner who objects to being punished on the grounds 
that only a miracle could have prevented his offending should not be met 
with the reply that his punishment will nonetheless be effective as a 
deterrent to others.219 Similarly, it would be unjust to reply to such a 
person that he is causally determined to be punished, just as it was unjust 
for the philosopher, Zeno, to tell his slave, who claimed that he was fated 
to steal, that he was also fated to be beaten.220 Such responses may be 
clever, and even darkly humorous, but they do nothing to lend authority or 
legitimacy to the criminal law. 
That is not to say that a consequentialist response to punishment could 
never be justified in a universe without criminal responsibility. For 
example, Chiesa argues that a consequentialist theory of punishment that 
punishes on the basis of the “dangerousness” of the offender, in order to 
protect society from harm,221 could be “more humane and efficient” than 
the current system.222 Under such a system, punishment could be re-
conceptualized as a kind of “quarantine in which individuals who are not 
responsible for the conditions that make them dangerous are deprived of 
certain liberties for the protection of others.”223 Such a system would be 
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aimed not only at the protection of others, which is closely related to 
general deterrence, but also at rehabilitation, which is closely related to 
specific deterrence.224 
Since retributive theories of justice presuppose blameworthiness,225 and 
blameworthiness is incompatible with causal determinism,226 then perhaps 
a consequentialist response to punishment is required, so long as convicted 
persons reveal themselves as dangerous through the commission of an 
actual crime and are not punished preemptively.227 If there is a problem 
with Chiesa’s view, it is in the consequentialist assumption that 
punishment is justified when its benefits outweigh its costs.228 There are 
two problems with this assumption. First, Chiesa does not specify what 
constitutes valuable consequences. Second, he does not specify how to 
perform consequentialist calculations. The latter is a problem for 
consequentialism generally because, as history shows, unethical decisions 
can be made in the name of maximizing good consequences.229 Indeed, as 
Hart suggests, consequentialism could lead to punishing the innocent if 
doing so would maximize the desired good.230 
I prefer a view grounded in an ethics of care and the principles of 
therapeutic jurisprudence.231 For example, applying language drawn from 
the Mental Health Act to the criminal law,232 the concept of punishment 
might be replaced by the concept of the “care, treatment or control” of a 
person, and be justified if it is “necessary for the protection of others from 
serious physical harm,”233 and takes place in the “least restrictive 
environment” that is causally efficacious in preventing such harm.234 
Although permitted in psychiatry, preventative detention need not be part 
of the criminal law,235 and offenders need not be kept in custody for their 
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own protection from harm,236 or for the protection of others from non-
physical harm.237 
If such a view were to predominate, then offenders, regardless of 
whether they were in custody, would not be perceived as criminals 
deserving punishment, but as people requiring care. For this reason, they 
might find themselves involved in various psychosocial programs focused 
on their habilitation or rehabilitation. This would be a more humane and 
caring response to offenders, but it might also generate a more humane 
and caring society. A positive commitment to incompatibilism would not 
be required to make this shift. All that would be needed would be a 
healthy skepticism about free will and criminal responsibility. 
SUMMARY 
It has been the purpose of this Article to argue that incompatibilism is 
plausible, and that, as a consequence, a view of criminal responsibility and 
punishment should be adopted that is consistent with the skepticism that 
this conclusion should generate. This purpose has been motivated by Hart, 
who defends compatibilism on the basis that incompatibilism is 
‘incautious.’238 In attempting to achieve this purpose, it has been 
convenient to consider the meaning of concepts such as free will and 
causal determinism, as well as various arguments for and against the view 
that criminal responsibility is compatible with causal determinism. It has 
also been convenient to discuss criminal punishment. 
CONCLUSION 
Some may accept Hart’s assurance that incompatibilism is incautious 
and that blaming and punishing criminals is justified, or one may accept 
Williams’s assurance that even if incompatibilism were true, such that a 
miracle would have been required for an accused person not to have 
offended, her punishment would nonetheless be causally effective as a 
deterrent to others, and would be justified on that account. In this Article, 
however, it has been argued that these assurances are ill-founded. This 
may be an uncomfortable conclusion for someone like Jean-Paul Sartre, 
who is said to have lamented that “determinism is a bottomless well of 
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excuses.”239 However that may be, it has not been argued in this Article 
that determinism is true, only that incompatibilism is plausible, and that 
jurists should adopt a view of criminal responsibility and punishment that 
is consistent with the skepticism to which this conclusion should give rise. 
In any event, Sartre’s lament is no more than argumentum ad baculum. 
That being the case, it is sufficient to repeat the words of Nietzsche, who 
wrote, “If you wish to strive for peace of soul and happiness, then believe; 
if you wish to be a disciple of truth, then inquire.”240 
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